What follows are
reflections on two marvelously rich and suggestive sets of essays, one dealing
with "New Testament Interpretation from a Process Perspective’ (JAAR,
March 1979) and the other dealing with Old Testament Interpretation from the
same perspective. It is important, I think, to set candidly into the record
(what will be clearly enough revealed in what I say, anyway) that my standing
in the process philosophy game is strictly amateur. Because of that, and of my
rather more long-standing interest in how theologians argue in defense of their
theological proposals, these reflections will deal far more with formal
questions about the use of process categories and doctrines than with material
questions about the cogency or truth of process theses. After reading these
essays, I find myself with three major questions about "process
hermeneutics." I will state them briefly now, and then develop each of
them in turn.
One: What makes
interpretation of a Biblical text an exercise in process hermeneutics -- that
is, is it the application of process theory of interpretation, or that it
involves the use of process categories?
Two: These essays seem
ordered to at least two quite different ends. Is "process
hermeneutics" an equivocal notion, naming quite different enterprises?
Three: If process
hermeneutics is important to process theology in order to make clear its
rootage in Scripture, is process hermeneutics able to provide any guidance to
what is normative in Biblical texts?
It will be useful at the
outset to distinguish two matters that the very title of this response tends
confusingly to run together, viz., (1) "Hermeneutics," in particular
hermeneutics as shaped by commitments to the conceptuality and doctrines of
process philosophy, and (2) the use of Scripture-as-interpreted in the course
of doing theology. Questions about hermeneutics, I take it, are questions about
what is involved in understanding, especially in understanding Biblical texts,
questions often answered by developing a theory about understanding. Questions
about the use of Scripture in theology are questions about how the texts, once
they have been understood, are to be brought to bear on the making of
(Christian) theological proposals. Answers to the first set of questions do not
necessarily answer or entail answers to the second set; nor do answers to the
second set answer or entail answers to the first. They seem to be logically
separate sets of questions. With regard to what these essays say and do
concerning hermeneutics, it will focus the discussion to ask two diagnostic
questions: (a) What does a process perspective tend to lead one to concentrate
on in the Biblical texts? What about the texts is taken to be of central
importance? (b) What kind of logical force is ascribed to Biblical texts
insofar as they are important for theology? Are they taken to have the force of
descriptive reports, or the force of injunctions, the force of emotive
expressions, or some other kind of force? And secondly, with regard to what
these essays say and do concerning the bearing of Scripture thus construed on
doing theology, it will focus the discussion to ask two further questions: (a)
How are Biblical texts brought to bear on the making of theological proposals?
(b) Why focus on the aspect of the Biblical texts that is focused on? What is
it about Scripture-as-construed that makes it important to attend to in this way?
I. Hermeneutics from a
Process Perspective
(a) What does a
"process perspective" tend to lead one to concentrate on in the
Biblical texts?
One of the claims made on
behalf of a process hermeneutics is that it can invite and empower the
interpreter to be equally attentive to all aspects of Biblical texts. That is,
in contrast to various phenomenological hermeneutics (notably, in the Bultmannian
tradition) which systematically constrain the interpreter to attend only to
that in Scripture ("kerygmatic" statements) which can be shown to be
an expression of certain modes of subjectivity (e.g., "faith") and
not to that in Scripture which seems to describe the cosmic context of human
life (except insofar as such descriptions can be shown to be culturally
conditioned, archaic and misleading expressions of modes of subjectivity),
process hermeneutics leads one to attend to both. And in contrast to structural
hermeneutics that constrain the interpreter to attend only to formal binary
patterns in the text and not to the relation between the text and its author’s
intent or to the relation between the text and its readers, process
hermeneutics leads one to attend to any or all of the above. This inclusiveness
is exhibited everywhere in these essays.
This raises my first
critical question: Is this inclusiveness of other methods of interpretation in
the actual practice of interpreting text really rooted in hermeneutics properly
so called, or is this hospitality to any and all disciplined methods of
interpretation simply an ad hoc collection of exegetical tools? That is, is the
hermeneutical pluralism reflected in these essays rooted in a distinctive
process theory of meaning or, perhaps, to put it less misleadingly, a process
theory of interpretation that systematically synthesizes the central theses of
alternative (and perhaps more one-sided) hermeneutics? The issue is not whether
there is a process theory of interpretation. If nothing else, the fact that
there are published efforts to lay out a process theory of meaning is evidence
that there is such a thing. The question is whether the pluralism of methods of
interpretation in these essays claiming to exhibit a process perspective is in
fact rooted in such a theory. If it is, then these essays can fairly be said to
exhibit that a process theory of interpretation can in fact be applied (and so
is not so abstract or vague as to turn out to be vacuous when applied to cases)
and that it is fruitful when it is applied. On the other hand, if the pluralism
is simply an ad hoc collection of exegetical tools, then, for all their several
excellencies, these essays do not show much of anything about whether there is
a useable process hermeneutics. My uncertainty about how to answer this
question can partly be brought out by turning to the second question.
(b) In these essays, what
kind of logical force is ascribed to Biblical texts insofar as they are
important for theology?
There seem to be two
quite different kinds of answers given to this question in these essays.
One answer takes Biblical
texts to function as "lures for feeling." This is explained and
warranted by Whitehead’s doctrine of "propositions." In their theoretical
essays in JAAR Beardslee and Woodbridge sketch the theory. The theory is relied
on explicitly in Beardslee’s and Pregeant’s exegetical essays in the same
volume, and it seems to me it is implicitly at work in Coats’s essay in the OT
collection. As I understand it, the relevant features of a
"proposition" are these: A "proposition" is a
"concrete possibility ; it is abstracted from some objective event in the
actual world; it is proposed as a possibility that an entity may want to
consider for itself in a future moment in its process of self-creation; it is
apprehended by the entity in "feeling" and so is preconceptual and
largely preconsciously apprehended; it stands in a complex of relationships
with other "propositions," and the set of propositions presupposes a
systematic universe; its "interest" (as "lure") is more
important than its "truth." Given all this, one knows that every
Biblical text expresses a proposition, indeed may express several propositions.
That is, Biblical texts, even when they might plausibly be said
straightforwardly to be describing some objective event or state of affairs,
are to be construed as having he force of proposing deal possibilities. A
conscious conceptual account of these possibilities would include an account of
the actual objective "systematic universe" they presuppose. But that
account of the actual universe would somehow be derived from the
"possibilities" expressed by the text and not from the text directly
-- for even if the text seemed on the face of it to be offering a description
of the universe, that description is not what is important or interesting about
it; rather "propositions" or ideal possibilities it expresses is what
is important about it.
In the essays by
Beardslee, Pregeant, and Coats, the various exegetical methods employed do seem
to be governed by a hermeneutical theory central to which is the process
doctrine of "propositions." Here there does seem to be evidence that
there is a process theory of interpretation that can be fruitfully applied to the
interpretation of texts. These same essays do go on to offer conscious
conceptual accounts of some of the possibilities presented by the texts they
study, construing the texts as expressions of "propositions." The
accounts are explicitly cast in terms of process categories. But note: What
makes them exercises in applied process hermeneutics is not that they
explicitly use process categories to describe the "propositions"
expressed by the text and to describe the systematic universe presupposed by
those propositions, but rather what makes them exegetical studies that exhibit
the applicability and fruitfulness of process hermeneutics is that they more or
less implicitly rely on a process theory about understanding, central to which
is the doctrine of "propositions."
Some of the essays,
however, seem to ascribe a quite different kind of logical force to the texts
they examine. Certainly, in Janzen’s essay, probably in Weeden’s (cf. pp.
114-17), and possibly in parts of Beardlee’s exegetical essay (cf. p. 68f.),
the texts studied seem to be taken as having the force of straightforward
descriptions, even ontological descriptions, of actualities (in contrast to
ideal possibilities). Collins quite rightly points out (1.13) that Janzen’s
exegesis presumes that Hosea 11 gives metaphysical information about God.
Similarly, Weeden sometimes, and perhaps even Beardslee sometimes, seem to
presume that NT texts give metaphysical information about the Kingdom of God.
In these essays the exegetical methods are as plural as are those employed in
other essays. But the judgment that the texts are to be construed to have the
force of giving (metaphysical?) information does not itself seem to be
warranted by any theory of interpretation, process or otherwise. The process
perspective" comes into play at quite another point. It comes into play as
process categories are used to provide an alternative, presumably more
sophisticated and precise, statement of the "same" metaphysical
descriptions. This second way of construing the force of Biblical texts, viz.,
as giving descriptions of actualities, seems part of a quite different
enterprise than the first construal of the force of Biblical texts (viz., as
expressing "propositions" that are "lures for feeling"). I
suggest that it really is not "hermeneutics" at all, neither
"process" hermeneutics nor any other, although it nonetheless is
certainly a kind of theology, even a kind of "Biblical theology." To
exhibit that, it is necessary to turn from hermeneutics to the topic of the
uses of Scripture in theology once the Scripture is interpreted.
II. Uses of Scripture in
a "Process Perspective"
(a) In these essays how
are Biblical texts brought to bear on the making of theological proposals? It
seems to me that Biblical texts are put to two quite different uses in these
texts. It is as though there are two quite different claims that are being
defended.
1. Some of the essays seem designed to argue in defense of some
claim such as this: Such-and-such a theological tenet is a truly Biblical
tenet, that is, is part of the doctrinal theology of a Biblical writing. Thus:
(Beardslee)
Text (Data) shows that
Tenet in Biblical Theology (Conclusion) Gospel sayings about finding The
theology of this text and losing life construed includes a tenet in which as
expressing both a these two are held up "proposition" re breaking up
together in a framework continuity of my existence of "rightness" or "creativity"
and "proposition" re a context creativity giving meaning to my
response of breaking continuity if: one can rely on the doctrine of
"propositions as lures for warrant for the move, as backed by Whitehead’s
entire theory of perception.
Or: (Coats)
Text (Data) shows that
Tenet in Biblical Theology (Conclusion) Balaam story combines a Obedience is
life-in-legend re Balaam as saint blessing in which the and a fable re Balaam
as saint remains free to sinner obey or not; disobedience is life-in-curse in
which the sinner is (relatively) unfree to obey.
if: one can rely on the
doctrine of "God as lure" for warrant for the move as backed by
Whitehead’s process cosmology. (So too, so far as formal matters go, in
Pregeant’s essay on Romans 2:6;13).
In these arguments the
move from data consisting of Biblical texts construed in a certain way to
conclusions concerning what truly is a tenet in some Biblical theology is
warranted by process hermeneutics, strictly understood, i.e., a process theory
of understanding.
(2) Some of the essays seem designed to defend a quite different kind of claim. It is some such claim as this: Such-and-such a doctrine in process theology is truly in accord with tenets of some Biblical theology. Thus: (Janzen)
Process Doctrine
(Data) shows that (Conclusion). Without losing ontological Process doctrine of identity,
God undergoes God is compatible growth in God’s knowledge and with a Biblical therewith
change in God’s description of God "being." undergoing "existential"
development via changing God’s mind. If: one can rely on an interpretation of Hosea
11 as a description of God’s "growing" through asking Godself an
existentially decisive question, backed by (Janzen’s) exegetical analyses and arguments.
(P. 185.)
Note the difference: The
first kind of argument mounted under the banner of process hermeneutics
supports a claim that such-and-such a theological tenet is authentically a
tenet of "Biblical theology" in the sense of being a statement of
what the text in its present complexly layered and polysemous form says on a
theological topic. It is a hermeneutical remark resting for its warrant and the
warrant’s backing on a distinctively process doctrine of interpretation.
By contrast the second
kind of argument mounted under the banner of process hermeneutics supports a
claim that such-and-such a tenet of process theology is "Biblical
theology" in the sense of being compatible with what some Biblical texts
say on a theological topic. This is "Biblical theology" in quite a
different sense of the term. It is not itself a hermeneutical remark, process
or otherwise, about Biblical texts.
The way in which it might
be part of "process hermeneutics" in a derivative sense of the term,
can be shown by considering how these two sorts of argument might be related to
each other. The second sort of argument, designed to show that certain process
doctrines are compatible with certain Biblical texts, was warranted by
interpretations of certain Biblical texts that were hacked by exegetical
studies. It is always possible for someone to challenge the bearing of that backing
(exegetical studies, say of Hosea 11) or the warrant it is alleged to back (a
given overall interpretation of Hosea 11, say). In that case, a second argument
would need to be mounted to show that the exegesis really supports the
generalizations made about what the text says. But that is precisely what the
first sort of argument does! The first sort of argument is designed to show
that what functions as warrant in the second sort of argument is indeed the
conclusion one should come to from certain data that function as backing for
the warrant in the second sort of argument. In short, the first sort of
argument is supportive of the second. If the first sort of argument itself is
warranted by the doctrine of "propositions" backed by Whitehead’s theory
of perception -- if, that is, the first sort of argument itself is warranted by
process hermeneutics, and then it in turn is used to support a second sort of
argument about the compatibility of various process tenets with tenets of
Biblical theology -- then in a derivative sense of the term the second argument
too is an exercise in "process hermeneutics." But only, it must be
stressed again, if it relies on a process theory of interpretation to show that
its backing does indeed support its warrant (and that is precisely what our
instance of this second sort of argument -- Janzen’s discussion of Hosea 11 --
does not do and does not seem to need to do; and perhaps so too Weeden’s
argument).
Note how very modest is
the achievement of this structure of argument. At most it demonstrates that
certain process doctrines are compatible with certain alleged tenets of the
theology of some Biblical writings. It does not tend to establish the truth of
the process doctrines; Collins surely is correct in saying that their truth would
have to be demonstrated on their own terms and not in this way. It does not
show that process theological doctrines are somehow more compatible or more
broadly compatible with some or all of the tenets of some or all identifiable
Biblical theologies than are some alternative (and rival?) theological
positions (say, Tillichian, Rahnerian, paleo-Thomistic----to confine the list
to positions couched in ontological conceptualities). Nor does it tend to
demonstrate the superiority of a process hermeneutics, i.e., a process theory
of interpretation. It merely shows that given process theological doctrines are
indeed compatible with certain tenets in some Biblical theology.
The (in my view) modest
outcome of all this labor prompts me to ask the final, and in some ways most
troubling, question in this section: If one is concerned to interpret Biblical
texts, why bother with process doctrines and conceptuality? Why should
exegetical Davids encumber themselves with philosophical Sauls’ armor?
The obverse of that question
needs to be asked too, of course. Why should process theologians concern
themselves with the Bible? In their Introduction to the JAAR collection of
essays, Cobb, Lull, and Woodbridge say that "Any form of systematic
theology is fundamentally truncated where its rootage in Scripture is not clear
and strong" (p. 25). Why so -- from a process perspective? That leads into
our fourth question.
(b) What is it about
Scripture-as-interpreted that makes it important to attend to in this way? I am
aware I am making some large assumptions here, but I venture the guess that the
reason a systematic theology is truncated when its rootage in Scripture is not
clear has something to do with the question of what is normative for a
Christian theology. I use the term "normative" deliberately, to avoid
the enormous conceptual confusions and red-herrings attendant to, say,
"revelation." So my question is: Is there a distinctively process
doctrine about how and why Scripture is related to and normative for Christian
theology that would explain why it is important to attend to Scripture in these
ways?
Woodbridge points out
that "Hermeneutics has been founded on the distinction between what the
text meant and what it now means. All too often this temporal and
epistemological distance has been viewed as a negative factor to be
overcome" (p. 124). He goes onto note that the traditional way to
"overcome" this negative factor was to try to establish what the text
meant at or near the time of its composition and treat that as a kind of
"essence" of the text’s meaning which thereafter is taken as the
retrospective norm by which all proposals of what the text might mean now are
to be assessed. This generates the assumption -- which I take to be very
misleading -- that contemporary theological proposals ought somehow to be
translations of the "meant" into contemporary idiom -- translations
that convey over the ugly ditch of long history the same self-identical
"meaning." That is objectionable on at least two grounds. It is
demonstrably false historically: There is constant material change through the
history of doctrine. Newer formulations change and do not simply
"translate" the "old" meanings. And the old formulations,
when used in later times and contexts, "mean" different things. And
it is a view objectionable on religious grounds. It suppresses the freedom of
the Spirit to bring new truth out of the texts: it forbids the religiously
exciting possibility that what the text might come to mean could be more
important than what it has meant.
In these essays process
philosophy is employed to cope with this problem in two ways. In some of the
essays, process philosophy seems to be commended on the grounds that its
categories do better what the categories recommended by alternative
hermeneutics (notably, Bultmann’s demythologizing by way of "existential
interpretation") do poorly. I submit that that is a very dangerous move
for process hermeneuticians to make because it threatens self-contradiction. It
seems to me that almost all of the alternative hermeneutics propose to do
precisely what we have agreed cannot and ought not to be done: provide a
conceptuality into which to translate what the texts originally meant in such a
way as to preserve that self-same essence of meaning but render it more intelligible
today. It would be self-contradictory to press process categories into service
to do better a task that process hermeneutics itself sees is misguided from the
outset!
In a few of the essays
process philosophy is used to cope with the meant/ means problem in quite a
different way. Cobb sketches a process theory about historical change and
historical movement, grounded in Whitehead’s notion of "living historic
routes." He argues that this theory allows one to make all the points that
can be made about theological changes through history by using Robinson s
notion of "trajectories," but without its postulation of some
"essence" of meaning that perdures through the change. And Richards
sketches an application of this theory in the interpretation of Lev. 27:1-8.
This theory has clear systematic connections to the doctrine of propositions as
"lures for feeling" which are linked with possibilities as "a
line to creative emergence in the transcendent future." That is, it
clearly is integral to a process theory of interpretation, a process
hermeneutics in the strict sense of the term. I find it a very suggestive and
rich way to describe the process of historical change from "meant" to
"means."
My question is whether the theory about the process of historical change that seems to be ingredient in process hermeneutics can also serve as a theory about what is normative for Christian theology. I can only say that I do not yet grasp its normative import. The issue is crucial. For if a process theory of interpretation does not include a theoretical basis for judgments about what is normative (in this case for theology) in the texts being interpreted, then it is entirely unclear how a process hermeneutics is going to head off the truncation of theology whose roots in Scripture are not clear. For the roots cannot be simply genetic in the historical order; they need to be normative in the logical order.
To summarize: I
find myself with three major questions after reading these two sets of essays.
One: What makes a mode of
interpretation of texts an exercise in precisely process hermeneutics -- that
it is the application of some distinctively process theory of interpretation,
or the use of a characteristically process conceptuality to formulate a
proposal about the "meaning" of a text?
Two: It seems that these
exercises in process hermeneutics are done as exercises in Biblical theology;
but it is "Biblical theology" in two quite different senses of the
term (although they could be interrelated).
Three: If these essays
are written to deepen process theology as a mode of systematic theology on the
supposition that a theology is truncated if its rootage in Scripture is not
clear, then it is crucial to be clear -- in ways in which these essays do not
make it clear -- how process hermeneutics warrants any judgments about what is
normative for Christian theology.
David Kelsey is Luther A.
Weigle Professor of Theology at Yale University Divinity School in New Haven,
Connecticut.
Source: Process Studies,
Vol. 13, Number 3, Fall, 1983, pp. 181-188.
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